A linguist on philosophical writing - Case study: Ruth Millikan. (It's complimentary!) (Thanks to Jerry Dworkin for the pointer.)
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taking the book, turning to the page, and pointing to three separate places on it, saying 'There's one misprint here, another here, and another here'Maddy 2017: 164 (Moore 1939: 147) Although of course, while that proves that there are three misprints, it does not prove that there are three misprints. And while you might agree with Moore that those were misprints, that would not amount to a proof that they were. Moore, you will recall, does not have to show that there are two hands, nor even that there are two hands, he has to show the externality (so to speak) of such things as hands, given skeptical doubts, which is more like having to prove not just assume, that it is indeed a bad thing to have lots of misprints. And of course, why would we have to prove such a thing! Ask yourself what is meant by "external world" to see for yourself how it exists by definition (and note how one gestures as one does so). And yet, it is precisely that "proof" that is challenged by skeptical doubts (as the above-linked-to review of Maddy 2017 observes).