Tuesday, September 01, 2026

What's the matter?

Matter is the stuff of physical reality.
Ordinary physical things (tables, chairs, cats, dogs) are made of atoms, by all scientific accounts; but are people composed of nothing but atoms? We are clearly part of physical reality (we interact physically with the world around us, and other people are clearly in the world around us) but as well as being physical, we clearly have feelings. And how could a lot of atoms possibly add up to something with feelings?
Does the difficulty of seeing how some huge number of atoms could possibly add up to something with feelings make it rational for us to doubt the atomic theory of matter?
Well, there is a vast amount of scientific evidence for the atomic theory of matter. Still, perhaps that difficulty makes it rational for us to doubt that people are just a lot of atoms. Does that difficulty make it rational for us to doubt the logical possibility of materialism though? That is unlikely in light of how little is known about what matter is.
If materialism is true, then matter is such that some structures that certainly seem to be composed of atoms do have feelings. In order show that such structures could not possibly have feelings, we would need to know a lot about the nature of matter. And beyond the utility of modelling physical things as being composed of particles that cannot go faster than the speed of light, and what it feels like to be physical, we do not know much about what matter is.
In short, we cannot show that materialism is contradictory; and it makes sense that if a hypothesis is not contradictory then it is, in all likelihood, a logical possibility. That is because when we say that something is not a certain way, we mean that it is not the case that it is that way. That means that it cannot be the case that something is a certain way and that it is not that way. So, a contradictory hypothesis is not a logical possibility. And for what other reason could we rule a hypothesis out on logical grounds? It is far from obvious that there could be another reason.
Now, it is precisely because we do not know much about what matter is that matter could, for all we know, be something that was deliberately created, by some non-physical creator, out of nothing but the logical possibility of matter.
Note that the possibility of there being such a creator is not the same as the possibility that the picture of a God that atheists pick up from the religions around them is a realistic picture. It is irrelevant, here, how unrealistic such a God may seem; what matters here is that logically, the concept of such a creator has never been shown to be contradictory (despite the best efforts of the brightest atheists). So, rational atheists should have as little problem with the logical possibility of theism as they do with the logical possibility of materialism.
However, to remain atheists they must, in light of my proof that atheism is illogical, either show that the logic of my proof is flawed, or deny one of its premises. And insofar as "logic" does not mean formal logic, there is nothing wrong with the logic of my proof. And rational atheists could hardly deny the existence of things like these words and remain rational, so they would have to deny the other premise of my proof, the logical possibility of theism.
Or would they? Could they not say that "logic" does mean formal logic when extraordinary rigor is required? Extraordinary claims do require extraordinary justification, and formal logic is as rigorously logical as algebra. Formalizing a logical argument makes a mathematical model of the argument. It gives us a rigorously logical piece of mathematics, in addition to the original logical argument. Still, that would not make the original argument less rigorously logical, not unless "rigorous logic" had been defined to mean formal logic.
And rational atheists could define "logical possibility" in a Lewisian way, so that theism was not a logical possibility.
Although if I defined "matter" so that atoms could not possibly add up to something with feelings, would rational atheists think that I had shown materialism to be false? Or would they think that I had given "matter" another meaning, different to the meaning that it has in any reasonable definition of "materialism"?

2 comments:

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    1. I needed to rewrite it a dozen times (it seemed like a simple idea to start with

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