The basic contrast is with imaginary objects: Pixies don’t exist, electrons do; epicycles don’t exist, bicycles do. We learn the meaning of ‘exist’ in a world of tables and chairs, trees and cars, and so when we say that electrons exist we mean that they exist like chairs do. We can spray them onto surfaces, for example, much as we might throw chairs into a van. We can catch chairs and electrons, but not pixies.
......If we doubted that chairs exist, what could we mean by ‘exist’ if we said that electrons exist? That they are in our best theory of reality? But the thing about epicycles is not only that they aren’t fundamental objects, in our best theory. It is that they don’t exist, to be further analysed, and therefore shouldn’t have been in our best theory. Of course, pixies exist within fictions, so they exist fictionally, but that is also to say that they don’t really exist.
......Some philosophers think that chairs are imaginary, that only the atoms that make them up exist, but how could that be right? A chair made of Lego bricks would still be a chair. It would still exist, wholly composed of Lego bricks. Had it been made one brick at a time, with one brick not being a chair, and with no addition of one brick making a chair out of a non-chair, it would exist. Consider how, even though orange fades smoothly into yellow and red, with no sharp boundary, that doesn’t mean that carrots are not orange.
Pruss and Rasmussen's Necessary Existence: Conclusion and Table of Posts - Pruss and Rasmussen conclude with an appendix providing "a slew of arguments" for the claim that there is a necessary being. These arguments are, for the m...
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