Flambouyancy

White-hot diamond
alights on liquid oxygen—
facets in the flames.

The Porpoise of Life

swims through the "C"s of grading.

I might get a "C" in gardening; but one thing I've learnt is that if I moisturize my hands, and especially my thumbs and my fingertips, with hand cream before I do any weeding, then the soil does not turn my thumbs and fingertips brown and dry. It is basically the opposite of dyeing one's hair: when one dyes one's hair, one begins by damaging the hair, so that the dye is absorbed into the hair. I don't like wearing gloves to weed because if I do then I can't feel where the stems are. I use tools for big jobs, but getting rid of the small, common weeds allows a wider range of flowers to completely cover the flower-beds (giving me more flowers more of the time and thereby helping to reduce flooding in wet weather, while helping the soil to retain its moisture in dry weather). It also means that I see more of the garden. The problem had been the staining of my thumbs and fingertips, which had proved impossible to remove with soap once it was there; but a girlfriend had told me how hair dyes worked years ago, and I put one and one together.

What is possible?

Presumably for something to be possible, e.g. epistemically possible (i.e. subjectively consistent with our other beliefs) or nomologically possible (i.e. objectively consistent with the laws of nature), it must be at least logically possible. So then, what is logical possibility? It cannot be mere consistency, for consistency is always with something. Perhaps it is self-consistency, i.e. the absence of self-contradiction, but what is that?
...... To begin with common sense, G E Moore thought that the idea that he was only dreaming, when he was actually lecturing, contradicted what he knew of himself, but was it then logically impossible that he was dreaming? After all, dreams might be very vivid, and even Putnam’s argument would not make it logically impossible for him to have just fallen asleep. And (on another topic that I’ve waffled about recently) the idea that I am nothing more than biochemical complexity, that seems to contradict what I know of myself, but I don’t imagine that I’d be allowed to call the theory of evolution logically impossible.
...... I’ve seen logical possibility associated with conceivability, e.g. a round square is inconceivable because it appears to be self-contradictory. But surely the laws that actually govern nature might be inconceivable by us (even in principle), and yet we would want them to be logically possible. And from mathematics, a typical real number is by itself too complex to be conceivable, but we think of it as conceivable because the real number line (which includes it) is conceivable, if not by you then by someone suitably authoritative. (And we allow that formal real numbers might be logically impossible, if inconsistencies lurk within the formalism.)
...... Suppose that there are aliens out there who know a lot more than we do about geometry. And suppose (if you can) that they tell us (one day) that there are square squares (in our geometries, with the usual meanings for those words) and round squares (in some others, similarly). Prima facie those conceivable aliens could, conceivably, be right about that (or so we could think, not unreasonably, if that happened, because after all, our experts have been wrong about elementary geometry, in the recent past, for all that it seemed to many of them that they could not possibly get such things wrong). But are round squares logically possible?
...... Anyway, does the discovery of a contradiction necessarily amount to the discovery of logical impossibility (and hence of non-existence)? I don’t think so because it might instead be that our predicates have been found to be less definite than we had thought (if their subject clearly exists). So even when that does not seem to be the case, how sure may we justifiably be that that was not possible? (I’m thinking here of the superficial similarity between a wave-particle, which is logically possible, and a round square, which is not.)
...... After all, Descartes’ demon (the rationalist’s friend) does not seem to be inconceivable or self-contradictory, and such a demon might possibly hypnotise us, so that not only do we make errors, when we reflect upon some of our predicates, we also believe ourselves to be incapable of such errors (much as we rationalists like to think we are, sometimes).
...... So, to return to common sense (i.e. to delete most of the above waffle, and post the rest), I’m left thinking that logical possibility must be, if anything, consistency within some given system of logic. Since we have many (inconsistent) logics, we would therefore have many (inconsistent) sorts of logical possibility. But presumably we want there to be one special one, that our system of possible worlds (with which we analyse our subjunctive conditionals), built upon our preferred system of logic, is attempting to model accurately; so I’m back to my original question (with no clear view of how to attempt to answer it), what is that?

More Weird Ideas

Speaking of other worlds, it occurs to me that since I’ve assumed the falsity of the many worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics in my forthcoming paper, hence I ought to develop something more like an argument against it—rather than the vague antipathy towards it that I've expressed at On Philosophy (for many-minds) and Mormon Metaphysics (against MWI). To begin with, either materialism is true or it ain’t; and if it is then I’m essentially my brain. According to MWI, I’d be continually budding into infinitely many others who had (until then) been me, which is what I intuitively reject. Maybe I can’t say for sure that that isn’t what it’s like to be me, because I can’t really imagine what that would be like, but prima facie that contradicts what I know for sure about myself (via my direct acquaintance with myself). And of course, were materialism false, the mind-brain interaction would need to be understood, and so in that case MWI would be much less attractive anyway. Not much of an argument so far, so I guess I ought to try to imagine what it would be like to be constantly splitting into infinitely many people... (Maybe not!)

Subjunctive

Speaking of indicatives, "If A then C" might be asserted because of a belief in the corresponding subjunctive, "Were A the case, C would be the case." What would make us believe that? Probably a belief in some underlying law (of nature) with such consequences. A common way of analysing subjunctives uses possible worlds, and I'm not at all sure about why I don't like them (as they seem suited to many normal uses of subjunctives, e.g. when the apposite law is probabilistically physical), or how I would rather analyse subjunctives (so this is yet another fishing post), but this is certainly an important philosophical topic (so I hope to post more in due course) because analytic philosophy is all about the logical analysis of various hypotheses, about discovering what would be the case under various assumptions (?) But therefore an obvious problem with any sort of possible worlds is that we are naturally going to want to consider what would be the case were there no such possible worlds.

Indicative

Speaking of common sense, it strikes me that the indicative conditional is obviously suppositional (subsection 4.3 of Edgington’s Conditionals), i.e. that “C, if A” asserts “C” iff A. Suppose I say: “The cat will sit on the mat.” Then (whatever my motives for doing so, however likely or unlikely it seemed, and however likely or unlikely it actually was), surely what I say will be literally true iff the cat sits on the mat. Similarly, if I say: “If the mat is not removed, the cat will sit on it,” then what I say will be true iff the cat sits on the mat that has not been removed.
...... If the mat is removed (for whatever reason) then my conditional prediction, while not false, failed to come true. What could make it true, given that the mat is actually removed? That the cat would have sat on it, had it not been removed? But that would only have made the corresponding subjunctive conditional true. Now, it may well have been a belief in that subjunctive (or counterfactual) conditional that made me assert the indicative conditional (about actuality), but it was the latter that I asserted, not the former. Of course, it may not have been—and indeed, the subjunctive might be known to be false (via the counterfactual probabilities) while both the antecedent and the consequent of the indicative are correctly guessed to be true.
...... The major alternative (to such a suppositional interpretation) seems to be the material conditional, but I don’t see why indicative conditionals with false antecedents should have truth-values. Are there any good reasons for thinking that they should? Even Edgington (third paragraph of subsection 2.1) calls it uncontroversial that “If that is a square, it has four sides” is true even when said of a triangle, but in fact what is clearly true is just “All squares have four sides.” Anyway, one problem for the material interpretation (first paragraph of subsection 2.5) is that according to it “It is not the case that if it is a triangle, it has four sides” ought to be false when said of a non-triangle. And while I suppose that if our logic is set-theoretical then the material interpretation is tidier, conversely if that interpretation is indeed false then that is indicative of the falsity of set theory.
...... And what about “If you disagree with me, I’ll hit you;” isn’t there some intuitive pull to the thought that I have, after all, made an assertion here? Well, the former is certainly an assertive speech-act—a threat—but what was actually said? To find that out consider that, because of the threat, I hide my disagreement and so avoid being hit—then the antecedent is true (I do disagree) but the consequent is false (I am not hit) and so the conditional is false, and yet the assertive speech-act is nonetheless successful (I do not show my disagreement). And although in a sense I complied because I believed what was said, what I believed was that if I had shown disagreement I would have been hit.
...... Mind you, that "If you disagree with me, I'll hit you" was probably intended subjunctively anyway, to mean the same as the counterfactual "Had you disagreed with me, I would have hit you" uttered later. Still, the speaker might have been (possibly correctly) a determinist, who thought (correctly) that I would not disagree, given his threat, and then there would have been no possibility of my having disagreed with him... Although clearly indicatives have the truth-conditions of material conditionals in possible world semantics, since to say if A then C is to say that the A-worlds are all in the C-worlds, which is just to say that no A-worlds are also not-C-worlds.

Surprisingly Common Sense

Because of my common sense, I know, as I type this, that I have hands; but presumably a disembodied, and therefore handless, brain-in-a-vat might think so too, as a result of its experiences being so arranged that they resembled mine, down to the smallest detail—so, perhaps I am such a brain-in-a-vat? My problem is that if I do not know that that is very unlikely (or impossible)—and how could I examine its likelihood?—then I can hardly justify my belief that I have hands; so I would not know (for sure) that my hands exist. That is a problem because one naturally feels that one’s confidence in such everyday propositions is fully justified, somehow.
...... But therefore we have G E Moore’s common sense refutation of such Cartesian scepticism (and Humean scepticism can be treated similarly, e.g. see my A Pair of ‘Sceptical’s): All such stupefying scenarios can be known to be impossible because one really can know that one’s hands (knees, feet etc.) certainly do exist. That is an almost complete refutation—only a scientific question remains. Sceptical scenarios are seemingly rational possibilities that are not made sufficiently unlikely by the empirical evidence, whence even when we are not tempted by the scepticism, they naturally raise such scientific questions as: How do we know that we have hands?
...... Insofar as we think of our knowledge of the external world as being constructed indirectly, from nerve-signals coming from sensory organs external to our brains, it is quite mysterious (in view of such sceptical scenarios) how our natural confidence in our knowledge of the ordinary things around could be justified. Nonetheless the foundations of our scientific knowledge are surely our common sense certainties (e.g. as we perform experiments), so we cannot really question them, we can only seek their scientific justification. Now, scientific questions require scientific answers and of course, as a philosopher of mathematics I don’t have a scientific answer, but what I can do is speculate.
...... The scientific answer would surely be some theory devised to account for scientific observations of the relevant phenomena, so we might ask ourselves: What would be relevant here? Well, in what ways might we become directly acquainted with things? A clue comes, it seems to me, from our need to explain the direct mind-brain interaction (since something else that is common sense is Cartesian dualism), because quantum mechanics is likely to be a key component of that explanation. If so, then (wavefunctions being spread out) we might expect direct knowledge of external objects to be possible too, and so the relevant phenomena could well include the micro-psychokinetic (the ‘micro’ means that the mind interacts directly with chance phenomena in the external world, i.e. not levitation).
...... Of course, common sense also tells us that the paranormal is not worth investigating. After all, such things are investigated, by reputable sceptics and by believers, and nothing ever comes of it. But then, a socio-economic explanation for that might involve that word ‘reputable’—I don’t want to delve into such issues here because they are intrinsically complicated (as political issues are). I’ll just observe that if I’m right (and why not?) then the paranormal would, insofar as it occurs, be the extremity of something quite normal (much as superfluids are), varying in the usual way of such biological things (and insofar as it does not occur—e.g. poltergeists—its plausibility could be similarly explained, i.e. via the ubiquity of something that is both obscure and like the fiction). After all, the empirical evidence is not inconsistent with lesser degrees of the so-called sixth sense being surprisingly common (e.g. consider the sense of being stared at, which would probably have been selected for if our underlying physics does allow it; cf. this recent research).
...... Just as Humean scepticism motivates our taking seriously what is common sense, that there are laws of nature (indicated by the correlations due to them), by verging upon a reductio of their non-existence (of there being only the correlations), so Cartesian scepticism motivates our taking seriously what is common sense, that we are directly acquainted with such natural kinds as hands (e.g. via a process akin to the mind-brain interaction), by verging upon a reductio of its non-existence (of our having only an indirect acquaintance with our own hands).

Balls!

So, a second week of OPC2—last week I found Williams’ paper helpful, clarifying for me some of what Wittgenstein was up to at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations. I know too little to engage with that debate, but it strikes me prima facie that (in the builders’ language-game) builder A’s “Slab!” (spoken to builder B) must have been the expression of a thought that we might adequately describe as “Bring me a slab!” or “Make it so that B brings A a slab.” Certainly A must have wanted a slab, and must have thought that saying “Slab!” to B would help to satisfy that want—otherwise, there could hardly have been a language-game. Cf. two robots, 1 and 2, with 1 beaming a pulse of light (of some sort) towards 2 whenever 1 detects an insufficiency of slabs, and with the detected pulse causing 2 to take a slab to 1. Could such a transmission of photons be a linguistic act? Maybe, in the sense of computer languages, but how about if a billiard-ball collides with another, so that the momentum of the first is transferred to the other—is that a linguistic act? And if so, what is not? So, underlying A’s command “Slab!” there must have been (as a basic linguistic component) a thought that we might adequately describe as A entertaining the epistemic possibility that B could (actually, but in other cases fictionally, or theoretically) bring A a slab (no thoughts, no language, is how I see it—I mean, language is a medium for the communication of our thoughts), which is a relation of intentional objects (?)

Such bandwidth!

My series of posts inspired by Dawkins’ The God Delusion finally ends (I really ought to be thinking more about logic) with his rather comic view of God. Someone once said, that when people told him that they did not believe in God, he asked them which God they did not believe in, and it strikes me that I would not believe in a God described by the following two points, which Dawkins was adding to an earlier response (the possibility of hallucinations etc.) to claims that personal experiences of God cannot be scientifically refuted (Dawkins 2006: 154):

First, that if God really did communicate with humans that fact would emphatically not lie outside science. God comes bursting through from whatever other-worldly domain is his natural abode, crashing through into our world where his messages can be intercepted by human brains – and that phenomenon has nothing to do with science? Second, a God who is capable of sending intelligible signals to millions of people simultaneously, and of receiving messages from all of them simultaneously, cannot be, whatever else he might be, simple. Such bandwidth! God may not have a brain made of neurones, or a CPU made of silicon, but if he has the powers attributed to him he must have something far more elaborately and non-randomly constructed than the largest brain or the largest computer we know.

Dawkins’ God seems here to be like the leader of some alien invaders from a parallel universe, because surely the Creator of this world would not need to “burst” or “crash” into it—no more than a human author would have to magically appear inside her characters’ fictional world in order to influence them. Of course, fictional characters are not alive, like we are, but that was only an analogy, and the key word is ‘Creator’ (if we have one, this universe is more her/his world than it is our world).
...... Her/his messages might bypass our brains (designed as they would have been for our dealings with this material world) and be received via our consciences (in some immaterial way), or they might be relayed via angels (for whom this world might be like the seas are to us, i.e. not so much unnatural—are houses natural?—as just relatively uncomfortable), or they might indeed arise within our brains, but since those would be brains that s/he made (or is making), so such information would hardly have to travel more than the zero distance from the tip of her/his metaphorical pen (which would be quite unlike any part of Creation) to the metaphorical paper (Creation).
...... No analogy is perfect, so consider another. In Flatland, mathematical creatures of both 2 and 3 dimensions occupy the same space, the former in a plane through which the latter might move as easily as they move through any of the planes of space. E.g. a cube passing through Flatland might seem to appear from nowhere, first as a small equilateral triangle, growing and changing into a rotating hexagon before reverting to a shrinking triangle and disappearing again—or as some other sequence of 2-dimensional shapes. It might be quite mysterious, to the dimensionally challenged Flatlanders, how the different possible sequences could be the same thing, but nonetheless Flatland is just part of the natural abode of the cube.
...... Now, perhaps elves would burst into this world upon the backs of unicorns, from their natural abode (Elfland), were they not fictional, but the Creator would be more like something that was to this world (Creation) as this world is to such fictional realms, were s/he to exist. And whatever the Creator is composed of (if anything), it would hardly be like the stuff of this world, whence we can hardly conclude that s/he must have any kind of elaborately and non-randomly constructed information-processor (although of course s/he might have, e.g. a host of angels).
...... Dawkins’ second point relates to scientific refutation because his argument for the improbability of God rests on our need to explain a complex God—but why should the Creator not be simple? Cf. how an author need not contain anything like her own complicated plots (just the insight, imagination and inspiration to construct such things, with pen and paper); cf. how a sphere is not a complicated Dr. Triangle/Mr. Hexagon character (within Flatland). Anyway, the theory of evolution having shown us one way in which complex (physical) structures might arise from simple (physical) beginnings, the assumption that the Creator could not be simple is an odd one for Dawkins to make.
...... Anyway, whether the Creator is complex (in certain respects, and from our point of view) or simple, there is hardly any necessity to her/him being non-randomly constructed. If s/he had an origin (and why should s/he?), it would be quite mysterious (why should it not be?), so maybe s/he arose randomly (and if we don’t know out of what sort of stuff, how can we say if it is unlikely?) and maybe s/he was constructed (why not an infinite sequence of Creators?). (But there should be time enough for Theology later, if there is any point to doing any.)

Origins and Nature

135 years ago today, Russell made his first noise. “But here is the problem: a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a description of the inner life.” (Wittgenstein 1953, IIix)

Signurture

As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
... As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
... Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell’s
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
... Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
... Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

That's one of Hopkins' poems (undated).

Elegant Design

I was out walking today, and I noticed how beautiful the wild flowers were. Nature has presumably selected such structures because they attract pollen-transporting insects, which were simultaneously selected because they associated the flowers’ colours, or their ultraviolet shines, with food, or something along those lines. So why, I wonder, do we find flowers attractive? A story might have been told, of how those who did not find flowers beautiful did not pick them, and so were stung less often and had more honey (etc.), had we evolved to find flowers unattractive, which we did not. Similarly, one could have told a story of how we came to find raw potatoes beautiful, were they beautiful. Now, we do find fruit attractive, and so such stories are indeed told about fruit, but therefore the beauty of the wild flowers is all the more puzzling—why do we not find, for example, dead animals attractive? (Did those who found raw flesh as attractive as the furry creatures that contain it succumb more frequently to food poisoning, while those who discovered fire and cooking survived?) So, I’m wondering (as in all my posts, what others may know) about the evolution of our appreciation of art. I guess that the natural selection of chemical structures might in all likelihood produce beautiful physical objects, but I’m puzzled by how it could produce people who find them beautiful. (E.g. rooks are clearly elegant, to pick up an example from my previous post, but why do we find elegance aesthetically attractive? We admire aerodynamic shapes in nature, and have done so in our own designs, from stylised cave-paintings to futuristic furniture, but we are not birds, so why?) The thing is, when fans of ‘Intelligent Design’ accuse materialistic scientists of giving us a bleak, soulless world-view, many of those scientists respond by pointing out that it was the majesty, the beauty of nature that attracted them to science in the first place. But it seems, prima facie, quite unlikely that evolved matter should find such things beautiful—what could the evolutionary point of aesthetic attraction have been? Beautiful clothes need not be practical, or even sexy, and there is more to art than the cuteness that we find in our young.

Furnurture

Although, I admit, I desire,
Occasionally, some backtalk
From the mute sky, I can’t honestly complain:
A certain minor light may still
Leap incandescent

Out of kitchen table or chair

That's from Sylvia Plath's Black Rook in Rainy Weather, 1956

Online Philosophy

I've just noticed OPC2, to look at later (whence this brief, memoesque post).

Faith unfit, in Fair weather

Having recently blogged about hope, I turn now to to charity and faith. I don’t yet know enough about theology to write much (or to keep my speculations nicely brief, unfortunately), but nowadays many of us begin by considering charity (e.g. donations, mercy etc.) and faith (e.g. traditions, loyalty etc.) to have evolved because social animals sharing the genes for such traits came to dominate our gene pool. If some such materialistic explanation is correct, then the sort of critical reasoning that we ought (I think) to favour over faith would presumably have evolved too, and would therefore seem to be, at heart, pragmatic, whence it might well be no more reliable, beyond our everyday uses of it, than our innate intuitions about, e.g., space-time. So I wonder about the limitations of materialistic justifications of our favouring of science over faith. Let us say that some materialistic Darwinian, D (not Dawkins, as the literalists ought to try to refute him), prefers science to faith, while some literalistic Christian, C (not me, as I’m a natural heretic), prefers faith to science. D thinks that C is wrong, but why?
...... Even D values authoritative testimony and teamwork within the sciences. Of course, C’s faith is getting in D’s way, and D does not like that. Nor does D like C’s sort of charity, which moves money that could be going to science towards religious interests. All that is quite coherent, but it might also seem a little selfish. Still, D is a scientist, pursuing collective truths, and so D does think that science is a good thing for everyone. But then, C thinks that faith is a good thing for everyone too. And C’s faith, like D’s science, is coherent on its own terms. So, is there anything more objective that D can say, against C’s faith? Paradoxically, what C and D prefer is (according to D) just a matter of how C and D evolved, so they are pretty much on a par at the base level of existence (according to D). If D fears that most people have so evolved that they are in danger of preferring faith to science, then what can D say about why they should prefer science?
...... Well, they probably already want useful truths (although they may well not want to get them for themselves), and so D could say that science is more likely to get them to useful truths. But of course C would disagree and although, for an example of the ensuing difficulties, D might mention in his defence that scientific sorts of evidence are what naturally sway juries, not protestations of faith, nonetheless whenever juries are swayed by faith D would say that they should not be, and so C could quite fairly say that in response to D’s defence. So, it begins to seem as if D is after all just grunting in disapproval at C. D can say that science is more useful than faith, that science is a better route to the objective truth than faith is, but not only can C say the same about faith, can D even explain why utility and truth are so important (let alone why a philosophically interesting truth is more important than a socially useful lie)?
...... The problem is that even if sciences are more useful than faiths, since when did a species have to do something useful when it did not want to? If humans end up being largely like C then they will value being that way; they may die out, but what species won’t. And if humans end up being largely like D then they will value being that way. And they might die out even more quickly, since the fruits of science do seem to present the immediate danger of extinction (while faith just involved millennia of tribal warfare). D could say that such things are irrelevant to whether or not materialism is true—(a species does not have to value its own long-term survival, according to D, it is just that it exists because it did survive, whence whatever it wants probably did have survival value)—but can she say any more than that about why truth is important?
...... D will probably, eventually, justify her interest in truth much as she explains it, i.e. on the grounds of its likely utility, so her problem (as I see it) is that, by the lights of her materialism, both C and D exist because their genes have competed successfully in the past. That is, D’s own theory puts D’s innate preferences on a par with those of C at the most basic level; and it even seems to imply that both of them are similarly intrinsically irrational. Since D cannot (without insincerity) appeal to anything more fundamental than shared preferences, arising through our common evolution, things look bleak for D because the evidence (that the culture war, naturally polarising between C and D, is not going her way) indicates their insufficiency.
...... Consider a lot of monkeys on typewriters, and let us suppose that one of them happens upon the printed truth. They ought to be out eating bananas of course, but there is a mechanism on each typewriter whereby they get bananas by tapping the keys. Now, each mechanism is switched off when its monkey types out a truth (of some specified sort). Consequently although our monkey has chanced upon a truth, it fails to produce viable offspring (through a too-early shortage of bananas). Many of the others will not so fail, but will rather become ancestors of the monkeys of the future. Of course, D does not say that our monkey should have produced viable offspring (or even that it should have wanted to), only that whatever it did want (i.e. bananas) would probably have been such as to lead to it having viable offspring. (Well, they did all want bananas, and eventually they all died.)
...... Now, both C and D want the truth, and both of them can justify wanting it on the grounds of expected rewards that are relatively big. They both think that they are approaching it, but what value do they put upon getting a truth, just insofar as it is a truth? They both prefer their method (faith or science) to the other, even in those cases when it is the other that chances (as they would see it) upon the truth. And they do both value the truth for its own sake, to some extent, more so than many people, e.g. those who prefer love, and faith motivated by love (and who would happily let a popularity contest decide the political issue between C and D). In particular, D values truth (since she evolved that way, in her opinion) but when she looks at things more objectively—say at that poor monkey—she can see little value in it having printed out a truth (or, indeed, in it getting bananas, or producing viable offspring).
...... D might point out that our search for the truth (via the scientific method) would bring us a high likelihood of rewards (that we are not like that poor monkey), but that is surely not quite so obvious when we are fighting and losing culture wars. While C could justify martyrdom for the cause of truth quite happily, D can only justify an extreme interest in truth on the relatively irrational grounds that that is just the way she is (a justification that would justify all other extremisms equally well, of course, for all that D could think of hers as being, since hers, special). Should D be a fair weather friend of truth? If so then perhaps she ought to be insincere about that, in order to protect her wider support.
...... Suppose (for the sake of argument) that D will not produce viable offspring, but will be killed, whereas C will produce viable offspring, since he is (let us say) going to win the culture war. Perhaps the human gene pool is just naturally moving in that direction, at this time. If D knew that, the wider public might ask her, would she still value objective truth, the way a scientist should? And if she did, could she see herself (in so doing) as objectively anything other than an evolutionary dead-end, with values that turned out to have little survival-value, in a world where life was all about survival?

Of that which we cannot speak

Ariel's ayre

Where the bee sucks, there lurk I:
In a cowslip's bell I lie;
There I couch when owls do cry.
On the bat's back do I fly
After summer merrily.
Merrily shall I live now
Under the blossom that hangs on the bough.

That's from Shakespeare's The Tempest, 1611.

No seas on Mars

..In the beginning darkness
......was upon the face of the
..........deep. And God said
......Let there be light
..and there was light

............And for the gate of the court
......shall be a hanging of twenty cubits, of blue,
......and purple, and scarlet, and fine twined
............linen, wrought with needlework:
......and their pillars shall be four,
......and their sockets four.

And the house, that is, the temple before it, was forty cubits long.
......And the cedar of the house within was carved with knops and open flowers:
............all was cedar; there was no stone seen. And the oracle he prepared in the house within,
......to set there the ark of the covenant of the Lord. And the oracle in the forepart was
twenty cubits in length, and twenty cubits in breadth,
......and twenty cubits in the height thereof:
............and he overlaid it with pure gold;
......and so covered the altar
which was of cedar.

............Two and twenty years old
......was Ahaziah when he began to reign;
......and he reigned one year in Jerusalem.
............Forty and two years old
......was Ahaziah when he began to reign,
......and he reigned one year in Jerusalem.

Who are you to darken counsel by words without knowledge?
......Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?
............Declare, if you know. Who laid the measures thereof,
......if you know: who measured out the ground?
And on what ground did the foundations rest?
......Who laid the corner stone thereof, when
............the morning stars sang together,
......and all the sons of God
shouted for joy?

............My God, my God, why
......have you forsaken me? As the hart pants
......after the water brooks, so my soul pants
............after you, O God. My soul
......thirsts for God, for the living God: when
......shall I come and appear before God?

And the rain descended,
......and the floods came, and the winds blew,
............and beat upon that house;
......and it fell:
and great was the fall of it.

............Nevertheless we, according
......to his promise, look for new heavens and
......a new earth, wherein dwells righteousness.
............And I saw a new heaven and
......a new earth: for the first heaven and the first
......earth were passed away; and there was no more sea.

Is my Red your Blue?

Prima facie such a question is unanswerable in principle, because we cannot look at things through others’ minds. And yet, suppose there is at least one telepath in this Universe who can, and who could tell us the answer. Or suppose that God exists (unlikely as that may seem) and that He shows us the answer. Or, if it could be shown that the nature of perceived colours is (probably) due entirely to their use by evolved brains, then we might learn enough empirically to (scientifically) know the answer. And so forth. All very speculative, but I’ve noticed that whereas orange is quite like red (e.g. orange dyes often look red), green is relatively unlike blue. So if there are those who find green and blue to be more similar than orange and red, then perhaps their red is my blue. That is, an increased likelihood of their red being my blue might be deduced, especially if they also find red rather than blue to be more like grey. If your red was my blue then you might think that dark yellow was orange rather than green (whereas I see that as a golden green). (And ain’t it odd that adding blue to yellow is like adding grey to yellow, whereas adding blue to white makes it look whiter?)

A Thief in the Night

Friar Tuck spent the day buying fruit bread in Nottingham, with money taken from the rich and corrupt. He was buying fruit bread for the poor to enjoy during the feast days of May, and it took him all day because he was also eating all day. Still, he was carrying a lot of bread as he headed home, and was feeling merry enough until Stalwart, a deputy of the Sheriff of Nottingham, approached, wanting the bread for himself.

Stalwart: Where did you get so much bread? Did you steal it?

Tuck: Would I, a man of God, have stolen bread?

Stalwart: Perhaps you thought that you were taking back what was rightfully yours. Perhaps you think that Normen like my lord Sheriff stole everything in England from you.

Tuck: But we have the same kings, Richard and the Lord whose man I am.

Stalwart: Of course; so tell me, how come you by so much bread?

Tuck: All things come from our Lord God, so you could say that these are His loaves.

Stalwart: But that means that they belong to you no more than they belong to me!

Tuck (starting to get indigestion): I am only a poor servant of God, but these loaves are destined for poor peasants, by God's charity; so, they belong, by God's will, to the Normen whose poor peasants shall enjoy them. You would be stealing from those Normen were you to take these loaves.

Stalwart: Why talk of taking? I am myself but a poor deputy. Could you not give me some of your fruit loaves?

Tuck (feeling a bit better): These loaves are not mine to give. They belong to our Lord and, by His charity, to those Normen whose peasants shall enjoy them.

Stalwart: Perhaps our Lord wants me to have some of them, though. I am, after all, but a poor deputy of my lord Sheriff, tasked as he is by our earthly king to keep this town safe from thieves and murderers.

Tuck (feeling more nauseous): I am glad that we are safe from thieves and murderers. And I do not claim to know infallibly the ineffable will of our Lord God. Do you think that that is indeed what He wants?

Stalwart: Yes, yes I do.

Tuck: Well, I suppose that our Lord might want you to have a few of these loaves; why else, I wonder, would He have had me standing here talking to you, as the night draws in around us, with its thieves and murderers?

Stalwart: Why indeed! And were you not tucking into a few fruit loaves yourself earlier? It seems to me that our Lord may well want a variety of poor people to have these loaves. After all, He gives us all our daily bread, does He not?

Tuck (seeing his way home at last): He does indeed, and so here is some more bread for you.

Stalwart: Thanks.

Tuck: Thanks be to God.

Tuck leaves with most of his fruit loaves, and a bitter taste in his mouth, and the thought that stolen bread was tastier.