It's now 10 years since my interest in mathematics became an interest in the philosophy of mathematics, but I'm not much closer to knowing why mathematicians standardly assume an axiom of infinity (which is described in the second comment below)—not the historical or sociological reasons, but what philosophical (or amateur-scientific) reasons those applying standard mathematics have, for thinking that an axiom of infinity is true.
......That they have found few problems with that axiom in a hundred years, for example, is an answer in a different ball-park—cf. how medieval astronomers found few problems with assuming (what seems clear) that the stars circle (and the planets epicircle) a fixed Earth. Ultimately the interesting question was does the Earth turn? And while our being able to imagine a star in each cubic lightyear of some infinite space is at least a metaphysical reason (e.g. see Benardete's "Infinity: An essay in metaphysics"), mathematicians have naturally been moving away from their previous reliance upon such geometrical intuitions (towards greater rigour).
......Not that standard mathematicians need any very good metaphysical reasons for finding most interesting those models of arithmetic that contain such an axiom (e.g. there are benefits to having a common language, and there was originally the epistemic possibility to explore) but if they don't have any such reasons then physicists and metaphysicians should perhaps not presume that some such axiom is true. And note that the question arises given that numbers are objective (that proof aims at, but is not to be identified with, truth), so that it is hardly an answer to have included Constructive mathematics within academia.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Liars, Divine Liars, and Semantics
Let ‘L’ name the sentence, “This sentence is not expressing a truth.” L seems to be saying that L is not being used to say anything true. If so then, if L is expressing a truth then L is not expressing a truth, whence L is not expressing a truth. But then, L seems to have been expressing a truth—that L is not expressing a truth—after all. In short, L is a paradoxical Liar sentence.
......Letting ‘N’ denote (for brevity) the property of not expressing a truth, L seems to say that L is N, but hardly straightforwardly. If we let T be “L is N” then I can say that maybe L only seems to say that L is N because of its resemblance to T. Note that if L is expressing a truth—if it is not N—then L is N (paradoxically), but if T is not N then it only follows that L is N (relatively straightforwardly).
......On this (fairly popular and) Traditional Resolution, L is a special sort of nonsense (and hence not true), its apparent sense being due to its resemblance to T (which is simply true). A related paradox is therefore Moore’s. Let G be the sentence “George believes that S is certainly P, but S is not P.” G may be true, but if George utters G there is something odd about it (even with “George believes” replaced by “I believe”), and were George omniscient he could only say G by lying.
......There are many other ways to resolve the Liar (e.g. Kripke’s, e.g. see subsection 3.2 of the recent SEP entry on Self-Reference), but this is certainly one possibility. And why should we expect there to be a unique resolution? Natural linguistic entities are usually only partially (and fuzzily) defined—maybe such incompleteness facilitates their flexibility?—and Liar sentences are relatively artificial, so it may well be that different resolutions yield different (but equally legitimate) extensions of our languages.
......Atheistic uses of Divine Liars (as follows) have therefore begged the question (so far as I can see). Let ‘DL’ name the sentence “God knows that this sentence is N.” If DL is not N—if it is expressing a truth—then God (an omniscient being, here) exists, and DL is N. So DL is N. But if DL is N then God should know that DL is N, which is what DL seems to be saying; so the atheist is tempted to conclude that God does not exist.
......A theist, on the other hand, could regard DL as some evidence that such appearances are deceptive, at least when it comes to sentences like the Liar (and to a lesser extent with Moore’s paradox), and an intelligent agnostic would be unable to make much of DL in the absence of compelling reasons to regard a different way of resolving such sentences (e.g. Kripke's) as the only correct one (not just the conventional one, as that would certainly beg the philosophical question).
......Incidentally it is usual to use non-well-founded names to define Liars (as Grim defined his Divine Liar, see second comment below), e.g. F = “F is N,” which creates additional problems for this approach (e.g. saying “F is N” is then to speak nonsense), so note that the atheist would additionally need to justify such an extension of the natural process of naming, to reap any benefit from such problems. (Prima facie it would be wise to analyse Liars and such naming seperately.)
......Letting ‘N’ denote (for brevity) the property of not expressing a truth, L seems to say that L is N, but hardly straightforwardly. If we let T be “L is N” then I can say that maybe L only seems to say that L is N because of its resemblance to T. Note that if L is expressing a truth—if it is not N—then L is N (paradoxically), but if T is not N then it only follows that L is N (relatively straightforwardly).
......On this (fairly popular and) Traditional Resolution, L is a special sort of nonsense (and hence not true), its apparent sense being due to its resemblance to T (which is simply true). A related paradox is therefore Moore’s. Let G be the sentence “George believes that S is certainly P, but S is not P.” G may be true, but if George utters G there is something odd about it (even with “George believes” replaced by “I believe”), and were George omniscient he could only say G by lying.
......There are many other ways to resolve the Liar (e.g. Kripke’s, e.g. see subsection 3.2 of the recent SEP entry on Self-Reference), but this is certainly one possibility. And why should we expect there to be a unique resolution? Natural linguistic entities are usually only partially (and fuzzily) defined—maybe such incompleteness facilitates their flexibility?—and Liar sentences are relatively artificial, so it may well be that different resolutions yield different (but equally legitimate) extensions of our languages.
......Atheistic uses of Divine Liars (as follows) have therefore begged the question (so far as I can see). Let ‘DL’ name the sentence “God knows that this sentence is N.” If DL is not N—if it is expressing a truth—then God (an omniscient being, here) exists, and DL is N. So DL is N. But if DL is N then God should know that DL is N, which is what DL seems to be saying; so the atheist is tempted to conclude that God does not exist.
......A theist, on the other hand, could regard DL as some evidence that such appearances are deceptive, at least when it comes to sentences like the Liar (and to a lesser extent with Moore’s paradox), and an intelligent agnostic would be unable to make much of DL in the absence of compelling reasons to regard a different way of resolving such sentences (e.g. Kripke's) as the only correct one (not just the conventional one, as that would certainly beg the philosophical question).
......Incidentally it is usual to use non-well-founded names to define Liars (as Grim defined his Divine Liar, see second comment below), e.g. F = “F is N,” which creates additional problems for this approach (e.g. saying “F is N” is then to speak nonsense), so note that the atheist would additionally need to justify such an extension of the natural process of naming, to reap any benefit from such problems. (Prima facie it would be wise to analyse Liars and such naming seperately.)
Friday, August 01, 2008
A Platonistic potential infinity?
One would naturally think that, for any time in the future (and similarly, for any point in space, any collection in a hierarchy of collections and so forth), either it is the nth day from now, for some natural number n, or it is infinitely far into the future, so that an infinite future might be divided into the finitely and the infinitely remote, the former region being infinitely many (i.e. aleph-null) days long since otherwise there would be no nth day for some n. But maybe it is not the case that, for any time in the future, it is either the nth day (for some n) or not.
......If it was an nth day, for some n, it would be so objectively; but maybe that property, of being an nth day for some n, is sufficiently like an indefinite property (as a consequence of the endlessness of the natural number sequence, not because of anything fuzzy about units, additions or repetitions, nor because of anything specifically temporal) for it not to follow that an arbitrary future time would either be an nth day (for some n) or not. (Such a possibility is indicated by how the natural assumption, of aleph-null, leaves us with a proper class of such cardinal numbers.)
......If it was an nth day, for some n, it would be so objectively; but maybe that property, of being an nth day for some n, is sufficiently like an indefinite property (as a consequence of the endlessness of the natural number sequence, not because of anything fuzzy about units, additions or repetitions, nor because of anything specifically temporal) for it not to follow that an arbitrary future time would either be an nth day (for some n) or not. (Such a possibility is indicated by how the natural assumption, of aleph-null, leaves us with a proper class of such cardinal numbers.)
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Presuming Personhood
Watching WALL-E, the best thing at the cinema this summer (and a decent argument against slavish adherence to 700-year-old authority), I suddenly noticed how the humans in it (who resembled jelly-beans) were just cartoons.
......It had been easy to see the cartoon robots as robots to begin with, and as WALL-E clowned around he was touching, e.g. when watching a video of realistic humans, and imitating them. But when the cartoon captain saw the same video I suddenly noticed how he was less than the blob he was in the film (which at that point in the film, he was transcending) and was an ‘it,’ was just lines and colours; and so I became involuntarily aware that I was just watching cartoons (fortunately only fleetingly aware). That dissociation being quasi-trippy, I winded up recalling how we naturally presume that something is a fellow person, when we are young.
......When we grow up, we may think of that as naive, as wrong; but is it? It is not that we ever apply positive criteria for personhood; we rather learn when things fail to be people. Inanimate things fail by being unconscious, and some animals may fail by being amoral, for example. The problem is that if we could know enough about the mechanical or random sources of anyone’s behaviour, we would stop thinking of that one as a person (fortunately we would blink, and involuntarily represume personhood, whatever we knew).
......I’m left wondering if we should define ‘person’ so, what do you think? If atheism is true, we would (probably) have evolved some vague and fluid criteria for personhood, and if theism then the fundamental entity is (probably) a perfect person, and personhood an objectively indefinable primitive (for us).
......It had been easy to see the cartoon robots as robots to begin with, and as WALL-E clowned around he was touching, e.g. when watching a video of realistic humans, and imitating them. But when the cartoon captain saw the same video I suddenly noticed how he was less than the blob he was in the film (which at that point in the film, he was transcending) and was an ‘it,’ was just lines and colours; and so I became involuntarily aware that I was just watching cartoons (fortunately only fleetingly aware). That dissociation being quasi-trippy, I winded up recalling how we naturally presume that something is a fellow person, when we are young.
......When we grow up, we may think of that as naive, as wrong; but is it? It is not that we ever apply positive criteria for personhood; we rather learn when things fail to be people. Inanimate things fail by being unconscious, and some animals may fail by being amoral, for example. The problem is that if we could know enough about the mechanical or random sources of anyone’s behaviour, we would stop thinking of that one as a person (fortunately we would blink, and involuntarily represume personhood, whatever we knew).
......I’m left wondering if we should define ‘person’ so, what do you think? If atheism is true, we would (probably) have evolved some vague and fluid criteria for personhood, and if theism then the fundamental entity is (probably) a perfect person, and personhood an objectively indefinable primitive (for us).
Sunday, July 27, 2008
74th Philosophers' Carnival
......Most people would find the following obscure and boring. Fortunately most people won't be reading it :-) so, for all you philosophers out there, here it is (a day early):-
......Philosophers' Carnival
......Language
a) David asks Does Truth Exist? and simply shows its necessary existence, as Mr. Contrarian.
b) Peter presents Parsons's Mathematical Thought: Sec 13, Nominalism and second-order logic, part of an interesting (if one likes mathematics) review of Charles Parsons's 2008 "Mathematical Thought and Its Objects" at Logic Matters.
c) Justin presents Experimental Work on Machery et al.'s "Semantics, Cross-cultural Style" , which undermines the conclusions of that previous investigation into the intuitions behind Kripke's Gödel case (from "Naming and Necessity"), at My Mind is Made Up.
d) Gualtiero, in Ramsey Reconsiders Representation, reviews William Ramsey's 2007 "Representation Reconsidered" at Brains.
e) Richard's Open Access Action is a petition (nominated by Terrance) to open-up a Journal (Philosophical Studies), posted at Philosophy, et cetera.
......Knowledge
(i) Ryan's Quantum Immortality shows us accessibly why Everett's interpretation of physics is hopeless. If you love that, you'll like chaospet.
(ii) Ed describes how Social spiders do better when hunting with relatives, which was posted at the accessible and interesting Not Exactly Rocket Science.
(iii) Manoj presents Perception, Physics and the Role of Light in Philosophy, the blog version of an article published in "The Philosopher," and now at Unreal Blog.
(iv) Noumena's Reconceptualizing Underrepresentation (nominated by Rachel) responds thoughtfully to Tierney's infamous article of July 15 NYT (on Title IX and Science), and is at The Headpiece for the Staff of Ra.
(v) Phillip presents some Problems with Transhumanism, e.g. "that technologies are, as a rule, more problem-engendering than problem-solving." More such equals The Coriolis Effect.
......The Will
1. Alrenous presents Concept Cagematch: Zombies vs Consciousness. Maybe we act on such nonphysical information as would be unavailable to Zombies, but this post concentrates accessibly on what consciousness is not. Posted at Accepting Ignorance.
2. Avery presents Why-Questions and Motive-Explanations, being a start on a theory of action: "an action counts as intentional if and only if it possible to give a correct belief-desire or motive-explanation of that action." Posted at The Space of Reasons.
3. Jared contrasts Reasons vs. Conditions, in what is perhaps about how reasonable reasons can transcend reason, but which may certainly be found at Sportive Thoughts.
4. Larry (aka larryniven) presents Wordplay, discovering equivocation in one of Dennett's arguments against the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Posted (a while ago) at Rust Belt Philosophy.
5. Michael presents Homosexuality, Choice and Dreaded Dark Overlords, being a short look at free will from the perspective of sexual orientation, posted at a Nadder!
......The Good
p = Matt presents Ethics of Manners. He argues that "the practice of good manners is unethical." Posted at A Mind for Madness.
q = Thom asks Should we elect all members of the House of Lords? They "can have the long-term interests of the country in mind, rather than newspaper headlines or general elections" so no, argues The Brooks Blog.
r = David presents "We study ethics to become good" Is this true anywhere today? But when would the good choose the freedom to be good, over their democratic responsibilities? The former (for USA) is preferred by The Picket Line.
s = Paul presents some Moral Commitment Problems, in which game theory seems to favour Kantian ethics, and which was posted at Uncommon Priors.
t = Ashok presents Towards a Nietzschean Understanding of Politics: Notes on "The Case of Wagner" (Part 1) "Socrates laughs, Jesus weeps." Posted at Rethink.
......And that's that...
......The 75th Carnival will follow in a fortnight at Wide Scope so if you are unimpressed with the above (or even if not) you should submit something to that. And why not host one yourself? That way you can have everything how you like it (-:
......Philosophers' Carnival
......Language
a) David asks Does Truth Exist? and simply shows its necessary existence, as Mr. Contrarian.
b) Peter presents Parsons's Mathematical Thought: Sec 13, Nominalism and second-order logic, part of an interesting (if one likes mathematics) review of Charles Parsons's 2008 "Mathematical Thought and Its Objects" at Logic Matters.
c) Justin presents Experimental Work on Machery et al.'s "Semantics, Cross-cultural Style" , which undermines the conclusions of that previous investigation into the intuitions behind Kripke's Gödel case (from "Naming and Necessity"), at My Mind is Made Up.
d) Gualtiero, in Ramsey Reconsiders Representation, reviews William Ramsey's 2007 "Representation Reconsidered" at Brains.
e) Richard's Open Access Action is a petition (nominated by Terrance) to open-up a Journal (Philosophical Studies), posted at Philosophy, et cetera.
......Knowledge
(i) Ryan's Quantum Immortality shows us accessibly why Everett's interpretation of physics is hopeless. If you love that, you'll like chaospet.
(ii) Ed describes how Social spiders do better when hunting with relatives, which was posted at the accessible and interesting Not Exactly Rocket Science.
(iii) Manoj presents Perception, Physics and the Role of Light in Philosophy, the blog version of an article published in "The Philosopher," and now at Unreal Blog.
(iv) Noumena's Reconceptualizing Underrepresentation (nominated by Rachel) responds thoughtfully to Tierney's infamous article of July 15 NYT (on Title IX and Science), and is at The Headpiece for the Staff of Ra.
(v) Phillip presents some Problems with Transhumanism, e.g. "that technologies are, as a rule, more problem-engendering than problem-solving." More such equals The Coriolis Effect.
......The Will
1. Alrenous presents Concept Cagematch: Zombies vs Consciousness. Maybe we act on such nonphysical information as would be unavailable to Zombies, but this post concentrates accessibly on what consciousness is not. Posted at Accepting Ignorance.
2. Avery presents Why-Questions and Motive-Explanations, being a start on a theory of action: "an action counts as intentional if and only if it possible to give a correct belief-desire or motive-explanation of that action." Posted at The Space of Reasons.
3. Jared contrasts Reasons vs. Conditions, in what is perhaps about how reasonable reasons can transcend reason, but which may certainly be found at Sportive Thoughts.
4. Larry (aka larryniven) presents Wordplay, discovering equivocation in one of Dennett's arguments against the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Posted (a while ago) at Rust Belt Philosophy.
5. Michael presents Homosexuality, Choice and Dreaded Dark Overlords, being a short look at free will from the perspective of sexual orientation, posted at a Nadder!
......The Good
p = Matt presents Ethics of Manners. He argues that "the practice of good manners is unethical." Posted at A Mind for Madness.
q = Thom asks Should we elect all members of the House of Lords? They "can have the long-term interests of the country in mind, rather than newspaper headlines or general elections" so no, argues The Brooks Blog.
r = David presents "We study ethics to become good" Is this true anywhere today? But when would the good choose the freedom to be good, over their democratic responsibilities? The former (for USA) is preferred by The Picket Line.
s = Paul presents some Moral Commitment Problems, in which game theory seems to favour Kantian ethics, and which was posted at Uncommon Priors.
t = Ashok presents Towards a Nietzschean Understanding of Politics: Notes on "The Case of Wagner" (Part 1) "Socrates laughs, Jesus weeps." Posted at Rethink.
......And that's that...
......The 75th Carnival will follow in a fortnight at Wide Scope so if you are unimpressed with the above (or even if not) you should submit something to that. And why not host one yourself? That way you can have everything how you like it (-:
Friday, July 18, 2008
Sussuration Song
.......Will shining shingle sing of God?
.............Dark incarnate hearts
pump hard, as rooks heave at dusk,
.............wing-beats glistening.
.......Clouds that shroud heaven
.......hang over shadowless dusk,
..............starkly reddening.
..............Robin’s orange bust
..............bobs a little rustily
..............in a sudden gust.
Robin Redbreast drops dead, poor thing, for
it’s night, and the slimy shingle stinks of cod.
..............“In your sight all is light
..............for ignitable spite,
for recursive respites see your fighters rehearse,
as your terse universe irreversibly worsens,,
.............Rudely tulips bloom,
petals plumped round jumbling genes,
bumped by bumbling bees. Two twirling butterflies
climb a double helix. I’m a double helix
.......whose whirling wonder dies. Sparks
...............swirling upwards flash
.......into ash-flakes (“Your words dye into
paper,,) as wounding winds use weaving waves
........to bury bones in gruesome graves:
................Robin’s flotsam grotto.
................To deliberate is to delete options.
........................On other shores the sea snores
........................as the waves break, saying
......................................................“je suis... Je suis...,,
Ruddy flesh haloed,
but pebble-strewn puddle owns,
................muddy cherry stones
........and so there will be cherry blossom
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
Call for Posts: PC74
Posts relating to philosophy are wanted for the 74th Philosophers' Carnival, which will be here. Submit anything by anyone, if it strikes you as interesting and accessible. If you're blogging philosophically, sign up to Host a carnival, and if not then start a philosophy Blog.
Monday, July 14, 2008
Aberdeen
Many thanks to all the people who made the Joint Sessions in Aberdeen very pleasant, especially Jonny:
I saw a mysterious looking man called Martin Cooke from Glasgow present a paper on a physically possible supertask that he thought proved that propensity theories were contradictory, or physical tendencies were, if there is a difference. There were a lot of structural similarities with the 2 envelope paradox, so I went over and started talking to him at lunch. We talked for quite along time before we realised that he had actually commented on Blogginthequestion! Under the pseudonym Enigman! “So you are Enigman!” I declared and shook him firmly by the hand.My talk went well enough (e.g. I didn't faint), although I was booed when I replied to a question about what I was proving by saying that my proof could be regarded as a proof that the counting numbers are indefinitely extensible, if we assume that physical tendencies are well-described by some propensity theory or other! The talks I sat through were more academic, as were the plenary speakers. The best bits were Kit Fine likening David Lewis to Thales (Lewis said that to question set theory would be silly, but his basic supposition was that there are no Laws of Nature) and a discussion on the nature of time (following an argument against presentism that was illustrated by a drawing, so that in effect, the force of the argument presupposed that time was quasi-spatial, imho; the man making the argument replied that presentism was crazy).
Wednesday, July 09, 2008
Sunday, July 06, 2008
Where have you been?
Said the straight man, to the late man,That's how "I Talk To The Wind" begins, 1968
Where have you been?
I've been here, and I've been there,
And I've been in between.
I talk to the wind,
My words are all carried away,
I talk to the wind,
The wind does not hear,
The wind cannot hear.
Thursday, June 26, 2008
What is Logic?
It seems to me that what we mean, when we say that some reasoning is logical, is that it is the kind of reasoning that would always, if we started with nothing but some truths, take us to nothing but truths. It is, for example, logical for me to deduce that you are a human from the (presumed) truth that everyone reading this is human, because if all the objects of a certain kind have a certain property, then any particular object of that kind will have that property. Why is that the case? Well, it just seems to be self-evident. I suppose that I could show the self-evidence by drawing a lot of red dots: given those dots, each of them is, of course, red (and each of them is a dot). Such reasoning is self-evident because it gives us just some of what we already had. Now, it seems to me that first-order logic is a mathematical model of such logical reasoning, which is about things (subjects) and their properties (predicates). In short, I take predicate logic to be linguistic, and first-order logic to be mathematical. But I am beginning to wonder if I have got this all wrong, because I found the following description of predicate logic on a paper in a book in the library:
Predicate logic (first-order logic) is a formal system that extends propositional logic by breaking sentences down into subjects, predicates (properties), and quantifiers. It enables precise reasoning about objects by defining properties and relationships, allowing for statements like "all dogs are blue", which propositional logic cannot express.
Friday, June 20, 2008
Travels = Travails
I'm Back in England for the Summer (except for Aberdeen next month) but all I'm doing is rewriting my response to Mawson and having deep thoughts... News Flash: I'll be hosting the best Carnival in the world wide web next month too (it needs doing hint hint and it's fun to play god :)
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Is there a question?
Is it the job of analytic metaphysicians, to put back the pictures that the axiomatic mathematicians remove from our scientific descriptions of reality; and if not, why not?
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Stuff (and this and that)
Kripke (Naming and Necessity) described how "water" means H2O because people once indicated the liquid form of H2O and said something like "that stuff," so that (via a causal chain) we now mean by "water" what they meant by it. But if so, then had some weird spacetime wormhole (or something) substituted that bit of water for XYZ briefly, just before they said "that stuff," then we would have been misusing "water" ever since (and obviously we have not, whereas it's not so obvious that such a substitution could not have been).
......Furthermore their folk metaphysics may not have been much like ours, way back then (instead of our chemistry, something like alchemy maybe), so why would "that stuff" have meant H2O then? Indeed, what stops us referring, with our "water," to H2O in any of its fluid phases (the liquid phase is largely H+ and OH- ions anyway), or to any similar mixture of hydrogen and oxygen (similarly) or of nucleons and electrons, or to just the oxygen or just the nucleons, or (conversely) to impurities in the water as well as the H2O (as we may well do ordinarily), and so on?
......Presumably we all presume some (similar) folky metaphysics, so that our "that"s are intimately (if subconsciously) associated with something like a description (if an indescribable one) in our heads. Furthermore, once we've separated out such descriptivistic content, there might not be anything externalistic left over.
......Even if the reference of "water" is fixed from day to day, by our thinking "that stuff" while thinking of some actual water, the substance underlying H2O might be a different one on different days (e.g. as subatomic strings randomly pointed in different directions, or something), and we would not then mean, by "water," different substances on different days. If the underlying variation made no observable difference, it would be like there was (as presumably there is) no variation; the stuff referred to would be the constant chemical (defined by its chemical description, and hence via the meaning of "chemical"). And if it did make a difference then descriptivistic content would again determine which stuff we were referring to (cf. normal versus heavy water).
......Furthermore, while there may seem to be an externalistic element with the "that" of "that stuff," there would surely be (after all the descriptivisitic stuff) an internalistic "this," because only a reference to this Actuality (containing both that stuff and us) would be able to lack descriptivistic content.
......There is therefore (for a frivolous consequence) surprisingly little incoherence between Biblical literalism and modern science; e.g. when originally creating water (not just below but also above the starry firmament) God would have had some description (some range of relational roles or whatever) in mind, but such details as the underlying substances (e.g. the particles that comprise the H and the O nowadays) might quite naturally have varied as the more crucial (e.g. moral and psychological) matters were settled.
......Furthermore their folk metaphysics may not have been much like ours, way back then (instead of our chemistry, something like alchemy maybe), so why would "that stuff" have meant H2O then? Indeed, what stops us referring, with our "water," to H2O in any of its fluid phases (the liquid phase is largely H+ and OH- ions anyway), or to any similar mixture of hydrogen and oxygen (similarly) or of nucleons and electrons, or to just the oxygen or just the nucleons, or (conversely) to impurities in the water as well as the H2O (as we may well do ordinarily), and so on?
......Presumably we all presume some (similar) folky metaphysics, so that our "that"s are intimately (if subconsciously) associated with something like a description (if an indescribable one) in our heads. Furthermore, once we've separated out such descriptivistic content, there might not be anything externalistic left over.
......Even if the reference of "water" is fixed from day to day, by our thinking "that stuff" while thinking of some actual water, the substance underlying H2O might be a different one on different days (e.g. as subatomic strings randomly pointed in different directions, or something), and we would not then mean, by "water," different substances on different days. If the underlying variation made no observable difference, it would be like there was (as presumably there is) no variation; the stuff referred to would be the constant chemical (defined by its chemical description, and hence via the meaning of "chemical"). And if it did make a difference then descriptivistic content would again determine which stuff we were referring to (cf. normal versus heavy water).
......Furthermore, while there may seem to be an externalistic element with the "that" of "that stuff," there would surely be (after all the descriptivisitic stuff) an internalistic "this," because only a reference to this Actuality (containing both that stuff and us) would be able to lack descriptivistic content.
......There is therefore (for a frivolous consequence) surprisingly little incoherence between Biblical literalism and modern science; e.g. when originally creating water (not just below but also above the starry firmament) God would have had some description (some range of relational roles or whatever) in mind, but such details as the underlying substances (e.g. the particles that comprise the H and the O nowadays) might quite naturally have varied as the more crucial (e.g. moral and psychological) matters were settled.
Sunday, June 01, 2008
Form is the diagram of forces
Dark incarnate hearts
pump hard as rooks heave at dusk,
wing-beats glistening.
Monday, May 26, 2008
Possibly Obvious
The Spiritual Resources of Weekend Fisher have recently been for those dealing with dying; and they're v.g.i. ... b.t.w. though, Jean Kazez ended an article on dealing with dying (People Don't Die, Do they?) on this thoughtful note:
......I also suspect that (re no place but) "here" refers either to all that the speaker's location is part of (which might include parallel universes, or even transcendental realms) or else only to the known part (and the presumption that that is all there is is rather arrogant), so that much of the force of Jean's thought might arise via equivocation (or waffle) ...a bit like saying that only physical things exist, and then defining "physical" so that if there was a transcendental creator of the Big Bang, ex nihilo and deliberately, for example, then that God would be a purely physical thing (which is—tellingly?—as good a defence of Physicalism as many professional philosophers can manage nowadays).
......On a deeper note, to end my facile post (since logic is concerned with truth, which is concerned with what there is), the following, from a letter from Stephen Bilynskyj to Peter van Inwagen (taken from page eleven of the latter's The Problem of Evil), belies nicely the idea that having the hope of Heaven encourages thoughtlessness.
We still haven’t had to cope with a major loss. But, when the time comes, we will cope with our feelings without any waffling. “He had a wonderful life. We’ll always remember him. He’s a part of us.” These platitudes don’t remove the pain of loss, but they’re the truth, as some of us see it. There’s no place but here. We think.What I don't get is how those so-called platitudes (trite or banal remarks) aren't more like waffle (evasive or vague speech). Was his life really full of wonders (and how could that have been possible); and will they always remember him? But I can't even make sense of his being (present tense) a part of them. Of course, it's important what valued others think of one, and so one's sense of who one is is already bound up with one's sense of what such people think of one; but surely that would not make one part of them, not even if there was nothing else left (and not even if they are their thoughts, and one is present in propositions about oneself, and their thoughts are propositional).
......I also suspect that (re no place but) "here" refers either to all that the speaker's location is part of (which might include parallel universes, or even transcendental realms) or else only to the known part (and the presumption that that is all there is is rather arrogant), so that much of the force of Jean's thought might arise via equivocation (or waffle) ...a bit like saying that only physical things exist, and then defining "physical" so that if there was a transcendental creator of the Big Bang, ex nihilo and deliberately, for example, then that God would be a purely physical thing (which is—tellingly?—as good a defence of Physicalism as many professional philosophers can manage nowadays).
......On a deeper note, to end my facile post (since logic is concerned with truth, which is concerned with what there is), the following, from a letter from Stephen Bilynskyj to Peter van Inwagen (taken from page eleven of the latter's The Problem of Evil), belies nicely the idea that having the hope of Heaven encourages thoughtlessness.
As a pastor, I believe that some sort of view of providence which allows for genuine chance is essential in counseling those facing what I often call the “practical problem of evil”. A grieving person needs to be able to trust in God's direction in her life and the world, without having to make God directly responsible for every event that occurs. The message of the Gospel is not, I believe, that everything that occurs has some purpose. Rather, it is that God's power is able to use and transform any event through the grace of Jesus Christ.
Monday, May 19, 2008
Omniscience and the Odyssey theodicy
Mawson argues in Divine Eternity (forthcoming in Int.J.Phil.Rel.) that Open theism (that God's future is to some extent open) implies that God is not omniscient and hence not omnipotent either, whence God's goodness would be, to some extent, a matter of luck! So in Omniscience and The Odyssey Theodicy I defend Open theism against that charge—hopefully introducing to a wider world (this world is so odd) my yearling theodicy (that we asked to be born because we wanted to be the instruments of a scientific investigation into God’s uniqueness) as part of that defence (since evil is less of a problem for theism if we asked to be born, which we could more plausibly have done if God is everlasting rather than timeless).
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Russell was Wrong
Russell thought that we could base a logical view of the world around us on our direct perceptions because we could not be wrong about a patch of colour being a certain colour. However, we cannot even guarantee being right about whether a square on a checkerboard is black or white, as this amazing picture shows: checkerShadow (PS, in 2015, YouTube had this video of the illusion)
Wednesday, May 07, 2008
Haiku; by who?
......Yellow butterflyThe best haiku ever (at least in translation)—I read it years ago and cannot now recall who wrote it (and Google was unusually unenlightening); does anyone out here know?
fluttering—fluttering on
......over the ocean.
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